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The Strength of Rhodes and
the Cilician Pirate Crisis
Keith Fairbank

I

n the years following the Third Mithridatic War, the Roman Republic faced
an alarming number of pirates. The impact these pirates had on shipping
became severe enough to result in almost unprecedented powers being voted to
Pompey in 67 b.c.e. His brilliant and successful campaign in the Mediterranean
wiped out the pirate forces that had impeded Rome’s precious grain supply and
had been a thorn in the side since at least 102 b.c.e.1 Until Pompey’s success,
however, the pirates had almost free reign in the regions around Cilicia. Several other
commanders had been thrown at them with special powers from the Senate, but
with little success. For 35 years the western seas were crawling with pirates.
Piracy in the ancient world has long been associated closely with Rhodes, the
pirate police of the Mediterranean. The island republic, though not very large,
managed to maintain a great deal of political independence for a great many
years, even when surrounded by large, competing powers. Its campaigns against
piracy can be attributed to its dependence on the sea. Tarn wrote, “It was only
states like Rhodes, subsisting entirely on sea-borne commerce, or Athens, dependent on sea-borne corn, that felt any real interest in clearing the seas.”2 Indeed,
Rhodian forces had for so long patrolled the Mediterranean that the pirate crisis
of the late republic is often blamed on the downfall of Rhodes.
Rhodes managed to stay out of Rome’s way and provide suitable assistance
until an unfortunate turn of events in the early second century b.c.e. As a result
of some poor political maneuvering by Rhodes and aggressive tactics by Rome actions were taken against the island in 167 and 166 b.c.e. First, the regions of Lycia
and Caria, formerly gifted to Rhodes in the treaty of Apamea in 189 b.c.e., were
revoked. Then, in a decree in 167 b.c.e., the Senate declared the island of Delos a
free port. Lycia and Caria had been sources of significant income for Rhodes in

1. Henry A. Ormerod, Piracy in the Ancient World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1997), 192.
2. William Woodthorpe Tarn, Antigonos Gonatas (Chicago: Argonaut, 1964), 88.
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a period when it stood at the “peak of its power.”3 Delos, the slave center of the
ancient world, benefited enormously from its new tax-free status, and Rhodes lost
a great deal of business.
These strokes against the Rhodian economy, the financial means of
that state which had, for so many years, held pirates in check, has long been
seen as one of, if not the, principal cause behind the pirate crisis 100 years
later. Ormerod wrote in 1924, “With the rapid decline that followed the
withdrawal of Roman favour after the third Macedonian war, it became obvious that the Rhodians were no longer equal to the task.”4 Much evidence
has come to light since Ormerod’s Piracy in the Ancient World, which certainly would have changed some of his conclusions. Even recent books,
however, have continued this opinion. Starr wrote in 1989, “instead it [the
Senate] struck at the heart of Rhodian strength. . . . Thereafter Rhodes did not
have the financial power to keep up its navy, though it continued to have some
warships down to 42 b.c.e.”5 A 2003 textbook stated the following: “The loss
of revenue from her Asiatic possessions and from harbor dues and banking so
crippled the finances of Rhodes that she was compelled to reduce her navy and
was no longer able to keep piracy in check in the eastern seas.”6 Further, “Ever
since the destruction of Rhodes as a naval power, the pirates and slave traders of
Cilicia and Crete had enjoyed unrestricted freedom of the seas.”7
Interest in Hellenistic Rhodes has yielded a great deal of new information
from which fresh conclusions may be drawn concerning the role of Rhodes in
the pirate crisis of the late republic.
A focus on the culture and economy of Rhodes has uncovered the means
by which its economy might have weathered Roman actions against it. New
archaeological evidence, especially ceramic evidence, has pointed to the long
stability of Rhodes, followed by gradual decline, as opposed to a previously
supposed steep and permanent one. Further study into the practicality of naval
warfare against the Cilician pirates further minimizes the involvement of the
island republic. In short, it appears that the fall of Rhodes had little to do with
the pirate crisis of the early first century b.c.e. In fact, it appears that there was
hardly any “fall of Rhodes” at all.
Let us first examine the Rhodian economy, the nature of its wealth, and
the means by which it funded its naval campaigns. Then, let us review the
problematic ceramic evidence in order to examine the wellbeing of the Rhodian
economy in the years following 167 b.c.e. Then let us briefly study the force
necessary to push out the pirate lords of Cilicia. Let us in conclusion see to the
3. Richard M. Berthold, Rhodes in the Hellenistic Age (London: Cornell University
Press, 1984), 165.
4. Ormerod, Piracy in the Ancient World, 189.
5. Chester G. Starr, The Influence of Sea Power on Ancient History (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1989), 60.
6. Allen M. Ward, Fritz M. Heichelheim, and Cedric A. Yeo, A History of the Roman
People, 4th ed. (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 2003), 123.
7. Ward, Heichelheim, and Yeo, A History of the Roman People, 171.
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influence which Rhodes may or may not have had in the crisis and the implications of our hypotheses.
In considering the effects of the Senate’s decree in 167 b.c.e., it is interesting
to note that Polybius writes of a Rhodian envoy’s complaints concerning a drop
in revenue after that decree. Speaking to the Senate in 165 or 164 b.c.e., the envoy
claimed that the country’s harbor income had dropped from 1 million drachmas to
150,000 per year.8 This is a very large sum, “yet either figure (one million or 150,000
drachmas) represents merely a fraction of the wealth flowing into Rhodes, the total
of which we are unable to estimate.”9 As Gabrielsen points out, the sum probably
referred to a 2 percent harbor tax, which would have been directly influenced by
the new position of Delos as a duty-free port.10 A much more significant blow to the
economy would have been the loss of Lycia and Caria and the respective incomes
they provided the state. But all things considered, “The sanctions imposed on the
Rhodians by the Senate were a heavy but far from mortal blow to the economy.”11
The very nature of that economy dictated that it would remain stable for a great
many years.
The Rhodian economy was most famously associated with the Egyptian
grain trade.12 The island’s proximity to both the great grain centers of the
world, and their principal customers gave it a unique position in that market.13
Gabrielsen argued that there were strong political ties between Egypt and
Rhodes which went back several centuries before any of the events mentioned
here. Certainly a country producing grain in such volume depended very
heavily on the safe shipment, storage (and the subsequent freeing of filled
Egyptian silos), and sale of grain, all services which Rhodian merchants provided.14 Famously the Egyptians underscored this dependence on Rhodes
when they, admittedly among others, provided immense aid to the island
after the tragic earthquake in 224 b.c.e.15 In short, the grain trade and, more
important, the economic relationship Rhodes shared with Egypt as a result of
that particular grain trade, was very firmly entrenched and was not likely to
be uprooted by a decree concerning Delos.
Not only was the grain trade a strong source of ongoing stability, but
“the Rhodian part in the grain trade was entirely in the hands of private
entrepreneurs.”16 Thus not only was the island a partner with Egypt in a
very profitable enterprise, this business was also carried out in the private
sector, where it was even more insulated from actions against the state. For
8. Polybius, Histories 30.31.
9. Vincent Gabrielsen, The Naval Aristocracy of Hellenistic Rhodes (Aarhus, DK: Aarhus
University Press, 1997), 64.
10. Gabrielsen, Naval Aristocracy of Hellenistic Rhodes, 64.
11. Berthold, Rhodes in the Hellenistic Age, 205.
12. Berthold, Rhodes in the Hellenistic Age, 51.
13. Gabrielsen, Naval Aristocracy of Hellenistic Rhodes, 71–72.
14. Gabrielsen, Naval Aristocracy of Hellenistic Rhodes, 71–74.
15. Polybius, Histories 5.88–90.
16. Gabrielsen, Naval Aristocracy of Hellenistic Rhodes, 80.
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instance, Berthold wrote, “The island republic still possessed perhaps the largest merchant marine in the east, and whether or not these vessels employed
the island’s harbors in the shipment of their cargoes, it was still Rhodian
merchants that were carrying the goods and taking the profits.”17 Thus even if
merchants bypassed Rhodian harbors for the untaxed ones at Delos (although
unlikely due to Delos’s inability to accommodate grain ships18) the profits
of the ventures would still be Rhodian. For all these reasons, the senatorial
decree may have set back the Rhodian economy but certainly not crippled it.
There were many wealthy citizens in Rhodes, and the aristocracy they
formed centered on naval service. As a solid military career was a prerequisite
for success in Roman politics, so a naval career was the launching pad for the
youth of hellenistic Rhodes. Gabrielsen wrote, “Naval service constituted a
paramount element in their self-perception.”19 This naval service more often
than not concerned the pirates of whom Rhodes was the sworn enemy. And,
as Gabrielsen went to great lengths to show, “A good part of the Rhodian
fleet probably consisted of ships owned by private individuals, who put them
in the service of the state.”20 If indeed private entrepreneurs were the driving
force behind the Egyptian grain trade, it would only make sense that they
would be highly invested in the safety of the seas. Even neglecting the strong
ancient tradition of the wealthy providing lavish gifts to the state, which in
the case of Rhodes would very fittingly be the supporting of warships, this
would strongly suggest that merchants and nobility kept their own fleets. This
privately funded pirate-fighting force would be relatively unaffected by the
events of 167–166 b.c.e.
While it is fine to talk about the potential stability of the Rhodian
economy after 166 b.c.e. and its subsequent ability to launch warships,
evidence is hard to come by. One of the few remaining indicators of economic
health available to the historian is the often problematic, however incredibly
abundant, ceramic evidence. Stamped amphora handles have been used in a
variety of studies for measuring the well-being of the Rhodian economy. It
is a delicate science, to be sure, and one must first get past the sheer number
of handles to be found. As Berthold wrote, “It is no exaggeration to say that
there is hardly a site in the Mediterranean where Rhodian handles have not
appeared.”21 However, if one assumes, as most scholars have, that the fluctuation in numbers of handles does indeed indicate proportionate economic
growth and decline, it can suggest what happened to the Rhodian pirate
fighting strength in the second century.
Many analyses of the distribution of Rhodian amphorae rely on political
events to explain significant statistical changes. The definite peak in numbers
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Berthold, Rhodes in the Hellenistic Age, 207.
Berthold, Rhodes in the Hellenistic Age, 207.
Gabrielsen, Naval Aristocracy of Hellenistic Rhodes, 17.
Gabrielsen, Naval Aristocracy of Hellenistic Rhodes, 101.
Berthold, Rhodes in the Hellenistic Age, 50.
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is associated with the unprecedented prosperity Rhodes enjoyed in the early
second century. The decline in distribution is explained by the aftermath of the
Roman actions in 167 and 166 b.c.e. This view makes it significantly easier to
explain the fluctuations but can be problematic. Vincent Gabrielsen explains:
In quantitative terms, the “peak” remains incontrovertible. . . . Yet, according to the accepted chronology, its terminal year—after which the
precipitous “drop” occurs—is 175 b.c.e. Even more disturbing for the
prevalent historical explanation is a new and very plausible calculation
. . . which dates the termination of the “peak” to 180 b.c.e. Whichever
of the two years one chooses (175 or 180 b.c.e.), they both fall within
the period that definitely distinguishes the apogee of Rhodes’ political
power—while the grant of ateleia to Delos is still nine or fourteen years
ahead.22

Such a dating of the drop nullifies the historical explanation, and thus
some reports find elaborate means of forcing the dates to coincide.23 However,
by far the simplest solution would be to accept that the decrees of 167 and 166
b.c.e. and their aftermath did not spell the end of Rhodian trade.
A new study by Lund found the following:
The combined evidence from Rhodes suggests that the number of stamped
amphora handles found in the island culminated between 200 and 180
b.c.e. A decline set in over the next decade, but the situation stabilized
itself at a relatively high level after about 170 b.c.e. and throughout the rest
of the century.24

This study shows that the Rhodian economy did not suffer a drastic blow
but was in decline years before 167 b.c.e. Further, it claims that the economy
remained stable thereafter. It is most noteworthy that the stable level which it
stayed through the end of the second century was much higher than the level it
had held before the “peak.”25
Gabrielsen, drawing on the studies of Lund and others, wrote that had it
not been for the unexplained peak, “we would have been perfectly entitled to
speak of a relative stability, and in certain places even growth, in the number of
handles, at least until 146 or perhaps 120 b.c.e.”26 If one accepts that Rhodes was
privileged with significant economic growth around 200 b.c.e., followed by the
fortunate acquisition of very profitable territories, Lycia and Caria, it makes
sense that the island would experience unprecedented growth. It further stands
22. Gabrielsen, Naval Aristocracy of Hellenistic Rhodes, 67.
23. Gabrielsen, Naval Aristocracy of Hellenistic Rhodes, 67–71.
24. John Lund, “Rhodian Amphorae in Rhodes and Alexandria as Evidence of Trade,”
in Hellenistic Rhodes: Politics, Culture, and Society, ed. Vincent Gabrieslen, et al. (Aarhus,
DK: Aarhus University Press, 1999), 202.
25. Lund, “Rhodian Amphorae in Rhodes,” figs. 1–14.
26. Gabrielsen, The Naval Aristocracy of Hellenistic Rhodes, 70.
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to reason that having lost Lycia and Caria and having suffered a minor blow
in the establishment of Delos as a free port, the Rhodian economy would sink
back to its original prosperity and continue on the course it followed before
stumbling across all this circumstantial wealth. As a logical extension, Rhodian
naval power should remain at that level at which it became famous for its prowess in policing the seas. In other words, the actions of the Roman Senate should
not have hurt the Rhodian military significatnly and brought about the pirate
crisis of later years.
Now, while it should be clear that Rhodes did not die a sudden death
when it fell under the disfavor of Rome, it would be irresponsible to suggest
that the island’s economy continued unimpeded forever. In truth, the same
archaeological studies which show the stability of Rhodes before and after
the “peak” show that the island’s economic output declined greatly around
the beginning of the first century b.c.e.27 Berthold calls this period the “Long
Twilight” and states that Rhodes sank into the background of a Roman world
like many other Greek states.28 This decline of Rhodian power is not, he
suggests, due to severe blows to its economy but rather to the loss of freedom
it suffered after the Third Mithridatic War. Concerning the Rhodian alliance
with Rome in 164 b.c.e., he wrote:
The conclusion of the alliance with Rome brought Rhodes relief from
the anxieties and insecurities stemming from Roman disfavor, but it also
marked the formal end of Rhodes’ independence and the final exhaustion
of the policy that had for over a century and a half maintained that independence in the face of powerful neighbors.29

This foreign policy—“the avoidance of entangling alliances and the concern
for the power balance among the great states”30 —had been the brilliant key to
the survival of Rhodes. In the aftermath of its alliance it certainly lost some of its
influence in the sea, but not to such a drastic extent as to render it incapable of
policing for pirates. However, the great pirate crisis of the late republic was alarming to say the least, and certainly called for more than policing. Ormerod described
it, writing, “Four hundred cities are said to have been sacked . . . so great was the
impunity of the pirate, who, without fear of molestation, caroused on every shore
and carried his raids inland, till all the coastal districts were uncultivated, and the
Romans themselves were deprived of the use of the Appian Way.”31
The menace was so great that it warranted the dangerous powers voted to
Pompey in 67 b.c.e. Rome must have been truly desperate to entrust so much
authority to one man. He eliminated the problem in short order.

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Lund, “Rhodian Amphorae in Rhodes,” figs. 1–14.
Berthold, Rhodes in the Hellenistic Age, 213.
Berthold, Rhodes in the Hellenistic Age, 212.
Berthold, Rhodes in the Hellenistic Age, 213.
Ormerod, Piracy in the Ancient World, 227–28.
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The sheer force Pompey brought to bear against the pirates of Cilicia is
indicative of their sheer numbers and strength. Ormerod describes a force of
120,000 men, 6,000 cavalry, and 270 ships.32 After sweeping the sea of pirates,
Pompey focused on their strongholds in Cilicia and, perhaps through sheer
intimidation, eliminated the threat decisively. The great many pirates who surrendered were relocated, and Pompey went on to greatness.33
The vast and devastating strokes with which Pompey cleared the Mediterranean contained one important element unavailable to Rhodes: a sizeable land force. The Cilician pirates were firmly entrenched. The term “pirate
strongholds” certainly does not describe lightly defended bases waiting to be
sacked. The force Pompey brought to bear against them proved sufficient, but
it was a force far beyond any Rhodes could ever have raised. Indeed, Berthold
wrote, “Even in its heyday the Rhodian navy could not have dealt adequately
with a menace of this magnitude, since the problem called for land forces
and a large rather than an especially skilled navy.”34 In truth, had the pirate
crisis come about in 180 b.c.e., when Rhodes stood at the height of its power,
its extremely skilled navy and superior ships could not have begun to deal
with the problem. Without naval bases and a vast land force in the region,
Rhodian forces could only have picked away at the vastly superior numbers
of the Cilician rebels.
In conclusion, the “fall of Rhodes” did not bring about the Cilician
pirate crisis of the first century b.c.e. In fact, there was no decisive “fall of
Rhodes.” The Senatorial decrees of 167 and 166 b.c.e. did not cripple the
Rhodian economy and its ability to continue its longstanding tradition of
fighting pirates. The Rhodian grain trade with Egypt and the private nature
of its commerce ensured its economic longevity. Similarly, the often private
nature of the Rhodian fleet guaranteed that actions against the state would
not necessarily reduce its naval capabilities. The island republic’s ability to
launch warships continued steadily throughout the second century b.c.e.
In truth, the Cilician pirate crisis was so large that Rhodes could never
have dealt with it. To say that a few actions of Rome crippled so great a state is
to cheapen the achievements of a truly fascinating entity in the ancient world.
Furthermore, to assert that Rhodes was responsible for the growth of such a
threat in the Mediterranean is to misunderstand the abilities and contributions
of the island republic.

32. Ormerod, Piracy in the Ancient World, 234.
33. Ormerod, Piracy in the Ancient World, 234–41.
34. Berthold, Rhodes in the Hellenistic Age, 228.

